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I. INTRODUCTION
During the last decade and a half, there has been significant recogni-
tion of the legal rights of children and increasing attention to the law
governing those rights. In addition to voluminous law review literature1
and treatment in texts,' the United States Supreme Court, lower federal
courts, and the state courts have addressed issues relating to children's
rights in an expanding number of cases. Among the areas that the courts
have scrutinized are children's freedom of expression under the first
amendment of the Constitution of the United States,3 hearing require-
ments before a student may be suspended from a public school4 or
subjected to a disciplinary transfer,5 the rights of students summarily
expelled from schools to sue for damages,6 corporal punishment of
students,7 free access by minors to contraceptive devices,' the right of a
child to secure an abortion without parental consent,9 and the right of a
minor to a hearing before commitment to a state mental hospital."
At the same time, there has been a parallel stream of legal
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1. See, e.g., Burt, Developing Constitutional Rights of in, and for Children. 39 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROB. 118 (1975); Children and the Law-A Symposium, 20 CAT. LAW. 85 (1974); Foster
& Freed, A Bilifor the Rights for Children, 6 FAM. L. Q. 343 (1972); Geiser, 7he Rights of Children, 28
HASTINGS L.J., 1027 (1977); Hafen, Children's Liberation and the New Egalitarianism: Sonie
Reservations About Abandoning Youth to Their "Rights", 1976 B.Y. L. REv. 605, Wald, Making
Sense Out of the Rights of Youth, 4 HUMAN RIGHTS 13 (1974).
2. See, e.g., P. ADAMS, CHILDREN'S RIGHTS-TOWARD LIBERATION OF TilE CHILD (1971);
CHILDRENS LIBERATION (D. Gottleib ed. 1972); L. COLE, OUR CHILDREN'S KEEPERS-INSIDE AmtIuCA'S
KID PRISONS (1972); R. FARSON, BIRTHRIGHTS (1974); H. FOSTER, JR., A BILL OF RIGHTS FOR CH1ILDREN
(1974); J. HOLT, ESCAPE FROM CHILDHOOD (1974); M. PAULSEN, THE PIROBLEMS OF JUVENILE COURTS
AND THE RIGHTS OF CHILDREN (1975); TIE RIGHTS OF CHILDREN: EMERGENT CONCEPTS IN LAW AND
SOCIETY (A. Wilkerson ed. 1973).
3. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
4. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
5. Everett v. Marcase, 426 F. Supp. 397 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
6. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
7. Baker v. Owen, 395 F. Supp. 294 (M.D. N.C. 1975), afi'd mem., 423 U.S. 907 (1975);
Ingraham v. Wright, 525 F.2d 909 (5th Cir. 1976), af'd, 430 U.S. 651 (1976).
8. Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
9. Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); Bellotti v, Baird,
428 U.S. 132 (1976).
10. Bartley v. Kremens, 402 F. Supp. 1039 (E.D. Pa. 1975), vacated, 431 U.S. 119 (1977); JL. v.
Parham, 412 F. Supp. 112 (M.D. Ga.), stay granted, 425 U.S. 909 (1976:1,prob.juris. noted, 431 U.S.
936 (1977).
NONCRIMINAL MISBEHAVIOR
commentary relating to children who are the objects of the
juvenile justice system,"' and a series of United States Supreme Court
holdings defining the procedural due process rights of children
charged with and tried for conduct that would be criminal if
committed by an adult. More than a quarter of a century ago, in
Haley v. Ohio,'2 the Court first significantly addressed the juvenile
justice system when it held that the fourteenth amendment made
inadmissible the coerced, confession of a fifteen-year-old boy.
1 3
Major due process underpinnings for the juvenile justice system
were first established in Kent v. United. States,14 in which the Court
held that in view of the procedural protections and benefits to the child that
inhered in juvenile court jurisdiction, waiver ofjurisdiction and transfer of
the proceeding to an adult court could not be accomplished without a
hearing that comported with constitutional due process.
A year later, in In re Gault,'5 the Court decided the first of an
important trio of cases that have defined the constitutional due process
perimeters of the juvenile delinquency jurisdiction of juvenile courts.
Gault held that in a juvenile court proceeding in which a youth may be
committed to an institution, due process requires adequate notice of the
charges, the right to counsel and the right to confrontation, cross-
examination and to the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination.
The Court's second major pronouncement was in In re Winship,16 which
held that proof beyond a reasonable doubt in juvenile delinquency
proceedings was no less a due process requirement than the safeguards
enunciated in Gault. Finally, the Court departed somewhat abruptly from
what had been an expanding recognition of due process rights ofjuveniles
when it held in McKeiver v. Pennsylvaniat7 that the fourteenth amend-
ment did not require the states to afford jury trials in the adjudicative stage
of juvenile court delinquency proceedings. As a result of Gault, Winship,
and McKeiver, the law appears to be reasonably well settled with respect
11. See, e.g., F. ALLEN, TiE BORDERLAND OF CRIMINALJUsTICE(1964); Gardner, The Kent Case
and The Juvenile Court: A Challenge to Lawyers, 52 A.B.A.J. 923 (1966); Ketcham, The Legal
Renaissance in the Juvenile Court, 60 Nw. U.L. REv. 585 (1965); Paulsen, Juvenile Courts, Family
Courts, and the Poor Man, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 694 (1966); Note, Rights and Rehabilitation in the
Juvenile Courts, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 281 (1967).
12. 332 U.S. 596 (1948).
13. Although Haley concerned the admissibility of the confession in a state court of general
jurisdiction, rather than ajuvenile court, the age of the defendant was a critical element in the Court's
holding. Mr. Justice Douglas, writing for the Court, observed that
what transpired would make us pause for careful inquiry if a mature man were involved.
And when, as here, a mere child-an easy victim of the law-is before us, special care in
scrutinizing the record must beused. Age 15 is a tender and difficult age for a boy ofany race.
He cannot be judged by the more exacting standards of maturity.
Id. at 599.
14. 484 U.S. 541 (1966).
15. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
16. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
17. 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
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to the constitutional protections required in juvenile delinquency pro-
ceedings. 1
8
Recently, the focus of attention has shifted to children's noncriminal
misbehavior, which is subject to the jurisdiction of the juvenile courts
through statutes proscribing such conduct as truancy, running away from
home, incorrigibility, ungovernability or waywardness, leading an idle or
dissolute life, or being beyond parental control or habitually disobedient.19
The courts' exercise of this jurisdiction has been subjected to several lines
of attack. Critics charge that statutory definitions of the behavior or
circumstances that trigger juvenile court jurisdiction over noncriminal
misbehavior of children are hopelessly vague and overbroad,2c that the
exercise of the jurisdiction unconstitutionally punishes a status,2' that an
adjudication under the applicable statutes labels and "stigmatizes" the
22
respondent child, and that exercise of the jurisdiction is an example of
racial and economic discrimination.23 In sum, critics argue that the
assertion of jurisdiction by juvenile courts over noncriminal misbehavior
of children is not only fraught with constitutional problems, but also fails
to serve any legitimate interest of the state and is not a valid exercise of the
state's power. These attacks have culminated in the demand that the
jurisdiction be abolished in order that children who engage in conduct that
would not be criminal if committed by an adult would be free of the
coercive power of the juvenile courts.24
These attacks and the demand for abolition are misguided. The
juvenile courts should retain their jurisdiction over certain statutorily
proscribed noncriminal misbehavior by children. The reasons supporting
retention are clear and may be briefly summarized. First, the abolitionist
18. See also Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975), which held that juvenile delinquency
proceedings place a child "in jeopardy" within the meaning of the double jeopardy clause of the fifth
amendment.
19. See notes 28-40 and accompanying text infra.
20. See notes 41-89 and accompanying text infra.
21. See notes 90-101 and accompanying text infra.
22. See notes 123-41 and accompanying text infra.
23. See notes 160-66 and accompanying text infra.
24. See, e.g., INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION AND THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION,
JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS PROJECT, STANDARDS RELATING TO NONCRYMINAL MISBEIIAVIOR (Tent.
DFraft 1977) [hereinafter cited as IJA-ABA STANDARDS, NONCRIMINAL MISBEIAVIOR]: NATIONAL
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS, JUVENILE JUSTICE AND
DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQULNCY
PREVENTION, STANDARD 9.1 (1976); NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE
STANDARDS AND GOALS, CORRECTIONS 573 (1973); SHERIDAN & BEASOR, MODEL ACTS FOR FAMILY
COURTS AND STATE-LOCAL CHILDREN'S PROGRAMS 14 (1975); Bazelon, Beyond Control of the Juvenile
Court, 21 Juv. CT. J. 42 (1970); Couch, Diverting The Status Offender From the Juvenile Court, 25
Juv. JUST. 18 (1974); Gilman, How to Retain Jurisdiction Over Status Offenses, Changes Without
Reform in Florida, 22 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 48 (1976); Board of Directors, National Council on
Crime and Delinquency, Jurisdiction Over Status Offenses Shoald Be Removed From the Juvenile
Court, A Policy Statement,21 CRIME& DELINQUENCY 97 (1975); Stiller& Elder, PINS-A Concept in
Need of Supervision, 12AM. CRIM. L. REV. 33 (1974); Weiss, The Poor Kid, 9 DUQ. L. REv. 590(1971);
Comment, The Status Offender and the Juvenile Court, 12 WILLIAMBTTE L.J. 557 (1976); Note,
Ungovernability: The Unjustifiable Jurisdiction, 83 YALE L.J. 138 (19741.
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proposals strike at the heart of the family autonomy tradition, which is
reflected in other statutes and judicial pronouncements relating to child-
adult relationships.25  Second, although some critics charge that statutes
proscribing noncriminal misbehavior by children discriminate unlawfully
against poor and minority groups, abolition may work to perpetuate such
discrimination. Third, proponents of abolition have not devised or
proposed truly realistic alternative approaches that will resolve the serious
societal problems which are now addressed by the existing statutes; indeed,
abolition is likely to give rise to a set of problems which could well make
the cure worse than the disease.26 I do not suggest that the exercise of
juvenile court jurisdiction over children's noncriminal misbehavior has
been free of abuse, but continued efforts toward reform may go some
distance toward alleviating the more egregious abuses. To focus attention
on abolition rather than reform is a serious mistake.
Part II of this article will briefly outline the statutory scheme that
addresses noncriminal misbehavior by children. Part III will identify the
major criticisms of the jurisdiction and indicate why I believe the argu-
ments for abolution are misdirected. Finally, in Part IV I will suggest
reasons for the retention of juvenile court jurisdiction over noncriminal
misbehavior as a proper exercise of state power in the area of juvenile
justice.
II. THE STATUTORY SCHEME
The earliest juvenlie court statutes 7 encompassed both noncriminal
misbehavior and conduct that would be criminal if engaged in by an adult.
The first Juvenile Court Act,2' enacted by the Illinois legislature in 1899,
was limited in its coverage to dependent or neglected children and
delinquent children. The latter were defined as children under sixteen
years of age who were in violation of any state law or city or village
ordinance.29  By 1905, however, Illinois had amended the statute to
include within its definition of delinquency "incorrigibility" and a broad
spectrum of other behavior deemed immoral.30
25. See notes 142-59 and accompanying text infra.
26. See text accompanying notes 167-94 infra.
27. The history of the juvenile court and the philosophy of the juvenile court movement are
treated in varying detail and with somewhat differing interpretations in A. PLTr, TIrE Cit.D
SAvERs-THE INVENTION OF DELINQUENCY (1969); PRESIDENT'S CoMIssIoN ON LAw ENFORCEMENT
AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT. JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUmi CRIME
(1967); Rosenheim, Perennial Problems In The Juvenile Court, in JUSTICE FOR TIE CILD (M.
Rosenheim ed. 1962); Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform: An Historical Perspective, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1187
(1969); Parker, The Juvenile Court Movement: The Illinois Experience, 26 U. TORONTO L. 1.253
(1976).
28. Act of April 21, 1899, 1899 Ill. Laws 131.
29. Id. § 1.
30. Act of May 16, 1905 IlL Laws 153. The amended definition provided in pertinent part:
The words delinquent child shall include any male under the age of seventeen years or any
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Modern statutes that give juvenile courts jurisdiction over noncrimi-
nal misconduct by minors generally take two forms. The first of these
adheres to the scheme of the early Illinois enactments and includes
noncriminal conduct within the definition of delinquency. Thus, for
example, Delaware's Family Court Act provides that a delinquent child
"means a child who commits an act which if committed by an adult would
constitute a crime, or, who is uncontrolled by his custodian or school
authorities or who habitually so deports himself as to injure or endanger
the morals or health of himself or others.' Similarly, some states,
without using labels such as "delinquent" or "ungovernable," group
together within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court children who commit
criminal acts and children who are guilty of noncriminal misbehavior. 2
The second type of statute that proscribes noncriminal misbehavior
by juveniles has as its prototype the New York statute that was enacted in
1962.33  The New York law distinguishes between the "juvenile delin-
quent," defined as "[a] person over seven and less than sixteen years of age
who does any act which, if done by an adult, would constitute a crime," and
the "person in need of supervision," defined /s
[a] male less than sixteen years of age and a female less than
eighteen years of age who does not attend school in accordance with
the provisions of part one of article sixty-five of the education law or
who is incorrigible, ungovernable or habitually disobedient and beyond
the lawful control of parent or other lawful authority or who violates
the provisions of section 221.05 of the penal law.34
Although some states have purported to curtail sharply3" juvenile
court jurisdiction over noncriminal misbehavior by minors, such jurisdic.
tion persists intact in the vast majority of the states under various labels.
female child under the age of eighteen years who violates any law of this State or any city or
village ordinance; or who is incorrigible; or who knowingly associates with thieves, vicious or
immoral persons; or who, without just cause and without the consent of its parents or
custodians, absents itself from its home or place of abode, orwho is growing up in idleness or
crime; or who knowingly frequents a house of ill-repute; or who krowingly frequents any
policey shop or place where any gambling device is operated; or who frequents any saloon or
dram shop where intoxicating liquors are sold; or who patronizes or visits any public pool
room or bucket shop, or who wanders about the streets in the night time without being on any
lawful business or occupation; or who habitually wanders about any railroad yards or tracks
or jumps or attempts to jump onto any moving train; or enters any car or engine without
lawful authority; or who habitually uses vile, obscene, vulgar, profane or indecent language;
or who is guilty of immoral conduct in any public place or about any school house ....
31. DEL. CODE tit. 10, § 901(7) (1974).
32. See, e.g., OR. REv. STAT. § 419-76 (1977).
33. N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT (29A) § 712 (McKinney Supp. 1977). Prior to the 1962 legislation, the
New York provisions were set out in its Children's Court Act which, as enacted in 1922, included within
its definition of juvenile delinquency violations of law and criminal conduct, as well as incorrigibility,
ungovernability and habitual disobedience or truancy, leaving home wifiout parental consent, and
habitual use of obscene or profane language. 1922 N.Y. Laws ch. 547.
34. N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT (29A) § 712(a), (b). Section 221.05 of the New York Penal Law
proscribes the unlawful possession of marihuana. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 221.05 (McKinney Supp. 1977).
35. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 601 (West Supp. 1977); IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.2 (West Supp,
1978); TEx. FAaI. CODE ANN. tit. 3, § 51.02-.03 (Vernon Supp. 1978).
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These include Persons in Need of Supervision (PINS),36 the original New
York designation, Minors Otherwise in Need of Supervision (MINS), 37
Child in Need of Supervision (CINS),38 Youth in Need of Supervision
(YINS),39 and Child in Need of Assistance.40 In this article I shall use the
most common legend, PINS, to refer to the subject jurisdiction.
III. THE ATTACKS ON PINS JURISDICTION:
ARGUMENTS FOR ABOLITION
A. Vagueness
Critics have charged that statutes conferring PINS jurisdiction on
juvenile courts are unconstitutionally vague in that they not only fail to
provide adequate notice to the respondent minors of the conduct pro-
scribed, but also are susceptible to arbitrary and discriminatory enforce-
ment. '  This conclusion, however, is not entirely supported by either the
decisions of the United States Supreme Court striking down vague statutes
in other contexts or the vast majority of state court decisions which have
addressed the precise issue. More importantly, even though there may be
statutory definitions of PINS against which the charge of vagueness ought
to be sustained, it does not follow that the total abolition of the PINS
jurisdiction of juvenile courts is warranted.
The test for the constitutionally required due process element of
notice was set forth by the Supreme Court more than one-half century ago
in Connally v. General Construction Co.,42 in which the Court observed
that "a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms
so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its
meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due
process of law".43
Later, the Court reaffirmed this principle in Musser v. Utah,'" and
recently it summarized the vices encompassed by vague statutes in
Grayned v. City of Rockford:45
Vague laws offend several important values. First, because we assume
that man is free to steer between lawful and unlawful conduct, we insist
that laws give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable oppor-
tunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly.
36. N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT (29A) § 712 (McKinney Supp. 1977).
37. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, § 702-03 (Smith-Hurd 1972).
38. E.g., MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-801(f) (Supp. 1977).
39. MOTer. REV. CODES ANN. § 10-1203(14) (Supp. 1977).
40. IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.2(13) (West Supp. 1978).
41. See IJA-ABA STANDARDS, NONCRIMINAL MISBEHAVIOR, supra note 24, at 8; Rosenberg&
Rosenberg, The Legacy of the Stubborn and Rebellious Son, 74 MicH. L. REV. 1097, 1124 (1976).
42. 269 U.S. 385 (1926).
43. Id. at 391.
44. 333 U.S. 95 (1948).
45. 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
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Vague laws may trap the innocent by not providing fair warning.
Second, if arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is to be pre-
vented, laws must provide explicit standards for those who apply
them. A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to
policemen, judges and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective
basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory
application ... 46
Although there is considerable variation in the language of PINS
statutes, the provisions may be divided into three general categories for the
purpose of examining the vagueness attacks. First, a number of statutes
specifically prohibit truancy or habitual truancy, and absence from home
without parental permission; that is, running away. 7 A second category
of proscribed conduct is described in terms such as ungovernability,
incorrigibility or habitual disobedience of reasonable parental direc-
tions.4' Finally, there is a kind of catch-all category which condemns
"leading an idle, dissolute, lewd, or immoral life," or proscribes behavior
"endangering the morals, health, or general welfare" of the respondent
child. 49 Before accepting the broad proposition that PINS statutes "are
almost invariably impermissibly vague in wording and overbroad in
scope,"50 it may be helpful to examine the statutes in light of the particular
categories of behavior proscribed and the pronouncements of the courts
relating to vagueness.
The infrequency of vagueness challenges to the first category of PINS
provisions suggests that the proscription of "habitual truancy" is very clear
and gives fair warning of the type of conduct that is prohibited. When
such language has been attacked as vague, courts have had little difficulty
in sustaining the constitutionality of the provisions. In Sheehan v.
Scott,5' for example, a fourteen-year old plaintiff sought to enjoin on
vagueness grounds the enforcement of a provision of the Illinois PINS
statute which included within its definition of minors otherwise in need of
supervision children subject to the state's compulsory education law who
were "habitually truant." The plaintiff, who had been absent for eleven of
nineteen school days, challenged as unconstitutionally vague both the
word "truant" and the word "habitual." The Seventh Circuit affirmed the
46. Id. at 108-09 (footnotes omitted). The Court added that a third, but related, constitutional
defect of vague statutes exists when the statute "abuts upon sensitive areas of basic First Amendment
freedoms, [and] operates to inhibit the exercise of those freedoms." Id.
47. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.01 (West Supp. 1977); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 15, § 2552 (West
Supp. 1976).
48. See, e.g., N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT (29A) § 712 (McKinney Supp. 1977); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §
50-102(4) (Purdon Supp. 1978).
49. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.022(c) (Page 1976). New Jersey includes a similar
provision as "[e]vidence of conduct which is ungovernable or incorrigible." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4-
45(dX2). (5) (West Supp. 1977). It should be noted that more often than not, all of the categories
described above are found in a single statute.
50. IJA-ABA, STANDARDS, NONCRIMINAL MISBEHAVIOR, supra note 24, at 8.
51. 520 F.2d 825 (7th Cir. 1975).
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order of the District Court dismissing the complaint for its failure to
present a substantial constitutional question and observed that the word
"truant" should be given its common ordinary meaning, and that the word
"habitual" had a well-defined meaning under the case law of thejurisdic-
tion. Similarly, a vagueness attack on the New York Family Court Act,
which included "habitual truant" within the definition of PINS, was also
summarily rejected. 2 Thus one may reasonably believe that the paucity
of cases involving attacks on the truancy element of PINS statutes reflects
the fact that the statutes are not only clear, but that the provisions do not
impinge upon the values which the void-for-vagueness doctrine protects.
5 3
Far more troublesome as unconstitutionally vague is what I have
described as the third category of PINS statutes. 4 A typical provision of
this variety was challenged on constitutional vagueness grounds in E.S. G.
v. State,55 in which the appellant had been adjudicated delinquent and
committed to a state training school under a section of the Texas Juvenile
Act which, at the time, defined as a delinquent child one who "habitually so
deports himself as to injure or endanger the morals or health of himself or
others."56 In a brief and questionable opinion, the court found the
challenged section of the statute not to be unconstitutionally vague, and
asserted merely that the word "morals" was in constant popular use and
conveyed concrete impressions to the ordinary person and that thirty-three
states had enacted similar statutes permitting delinquency adjudications
for immoral conduct. 7 A virtually identical response was made by the
Appellate Division of the New Jersey Superior Court in State v. LN.,58 in
which the statutory language under attack included within the definition of
juvenile delinquency "[g]rowing up in idleness or delinquency," 59 and
"[d]eportment endangering the morals, health or general welfare of [the]
child. 60  Again, without the barest reference to the Supreme Court's
constitutional pronouncements on vagueness and by relying on authorities
52. In re Mario, 65 Misc. 2d 708, 317 N.Y.S.2d 659 (Fain. Ct. 1971). The court observed that
[w]hile the statutory definition of a PINS as an "habitual truant" may lack mathematical
precision, there is no violation of due process in its application herein nor in the customary
manner of its application by this court. As in the instant case, the established procedure of
the Family Court in truancy cases is first to place the child on parole or probation in the
community, imposing specific requirements as to regular school attendance (as well as
requirements in aid thereof such as a night-time curfew); placement is effected only if such
specific conditions are disobeyed. Thus, respondent had adequate notice and warning of
specific directions to be obeyed to avoid placement.
65 Misc. 2d at 715, 317 N.Y.S. 2d at 666 (footnotes omitted).
53. See text accompanying notes 42-46 supra.
54. See note 49 and accompanying text supra.
55. 447 S.W.2d 225 (rex. Ct. App. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 956 (1970).
56. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2338-1, § 3() (Vernon 1971). The Texas statute has since
been amended to remove the offensive language. See TEx. FAst. CODE ANN. tit. 3, § 51.03(b) (Vernon
Supp. 1978).
57. 447 S.W. 2d at 226.
58. 109 N.J. Super. 278, 263 A.2d 150 (1970).
59. N.J. STAr. ANN. § 2A:4-14(i) (West 1952).
60. NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A4-14(m) (West 1952).
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from other jurisdictions approving similar juvenile delinquency statutes,
the court found no constitutional infirmity.6"
Despite the apparent willingness of some courts to uphold the
broadest and most general PINS provisions, there have recently been
significant departures from this trend. At issue in Gonzalez v. Mailliard6"
was an allegedly unconstitutional statute that subjected to adjudication as
a ward of the court a child "who from any cause is in danger of leading an
idle, dissolute, lewd, or immoral life."63 The court struck down this
statute, for it saw no significant distinction between this language and
similar language in adult vagrancy statutes that had been found unconsti-
tutionally vague by a number of federal courts. 64 The court pointed out
that an adjudication under the California statute could result in both
serious deprivation of freedom and the attachment of social stigma, and
that two further reasons for disapproving the statute existed. First, the
procedural due process rights recognized in In re Gault65 would be useless
to a defendant faced with charges in the vague language of the statute.
Second, the state could easily avoid the "proof beyond a reasonable
doubt" standard set out in In re Winship66 by the mere device of substitut-
ing a charge and proof of "potentially immoral conduct of life" in instances
in which conduct which would be criminal for an adult could not be
proved.67
Although New York's Wayward Minor statute was a part of the
state's Code of Criminal Procedure and not technically a PINS provision,
it was held in part unconstitutionally vague in Gesicki v. Oswald68 for
reasons closely akin to those expressed in Gonzalez v. Mailliard. The
statutory language challenged in Gesicki included within the definition of
wayward minor a child who was "morally depraved or in danger of
becoming morally depraved., 69 The court applied the vagueness standard
61. See also S**** S**** v. State, 299 A.2d 560 (Me. 1973), upho'ding the constitutionality of
ME. REv. STAT. tit. 15, § 2552 (1965), which authorized adjudication a- a juvenile offender a child
"living in circumstances of manifest danger of falling into habits of vice or immorality."
62. No. 50424 (N.D. Cal, Feb. 9, 1971) (three-judge court) vacated and remanded, 416 U.S, 918
(1974). rhe text of this unreported case appears as an appendix to a recent comment on the case,
Roybal, Voidfor Vagueness: State Statutes Proscribing Conduct Only For a Juvenile, I PEPI'ItDINu
L. REv. 1 (1973).
63. CAL. WELt. &INST. CODE § 601 (West 1966) (amended 1975)
64. Subsequent to the Gonzalez decision, the United States Supreme Court also addressed an
adult vagrancy statute and found it to be unconstitutional. Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156
(1972).
65. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
66. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
67. Roybal, supra note 62, at 19.
68. 336 F. Supp. 371 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), afl'dmem., 406 U.S. 913 (1972). See generally Comment,
Juvenile Statutes and Noncriminal Delinquents: Appling The Void.for Vagueness Doctrine, 4 SEON
HALL L. REV. 184 (1972).
69. N. Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 913-a (McKinney 1945).
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in Connally° and found the indicted language "far beyond the bounds of
permissible ambiguity in a standard defining a criminal act."'
I have suggested thus far that those provisions of PINS statutes which
proscribe truancy, or in some cases habitual truancy, and running away
from home are not vague. They have rarely been challenged on constitu-
tional vagueness grounds, and no case has been found in which such a
provision was invalidated. The "catchall" or "omnibus" provisions of
PINS or PINS-type statutes, on the other hand, have been held to be
unconstitutionally vague in the better reasoned cases. I come now to what
I have described as the second category of PINS proscriptions, which are
found in statutes cast in terms such as ungovernability, incorrigibility and
beyond parental control.72 Although such provisions have been attacked
frequently as vague, state courts have generally found little difficulty in
sustaining the statutes and denying relief. It ought to be conceded,
however, that some of the decisions reaching this result are at best
questionable. In In re Jackson,73 a Washington appellate court sustained
a statute that defined an "incorrigible" child as one "who is beyond the
control and power of his parents, guardian, or custodian by reason of the
conduct or nature of said child. 74 The court initially observed that not
every prohibited act need be spelled out so long as the general terms of a
statute are understandable and found that the language in question gave
fair notice to the child because "[c]hildren of ordinary understanding know
that they must obey their parents or those jersons lawfully standing in a
parent's place. 75 Similarly, In re Napier 6 involved a claim of lack of
notice sufficient to satisfy constitutional due process requirements when
appellant was charged under the portion of the Oklahoma PINS statute
which defined a child in need of supervision as one "who is beyond the
control of his parents, guardian or other custodian . . ... 7 The court
rejected appellants claim, but simply cited a long line of cases from other
jurisdictions upholding a variety of PINS statutes to justify its conclusion
that the language was not vague. Nowhere in its opinion did the court
address squarely appelant's contention that the statute failed to give
notice of what conduct was proscribed or to provide standards for inferior
courts.
70. See text accompanying note 43 supra.
71. 336 F. Supp. at 374. The Gesicki court, citing Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660(1962),
also held that use of the term "morally depraved" in the statute unconstitutionally permitted
punishment of a status or condition. Id. at 376 n.6. For a discussion of and response to the frequent
assertion that PINS statutes unconstitutionally punish the status of childhood, see text accompanying
notes 90-101 infra.
72. See text accompanying note 48 supra.
73. 6 Wash. App. 962, 497 P.2d 259 (1972).
74. WAsH. Rav. CODE ANN. § 13.04.010(7) (1962).
75. In re Jackson, 6 Wash. App. 962, 964, 497 P.2d 259, 261 (1972).
76. 532 P.2d 423 (Okla. 1975).
77. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1101(c) (West Supp. 1974).
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More persuasive are those opinions that have read incorrigibility
more narrowly or have upheld such provisions when they are more
narrowly drafted. In Blondheim v. State,78 for example, the Supreme
Court of Washington considered the same language which had previously
been upheld in Jackson. Although the court simply relied on Jackson for
its conclusion that the statute was not vague, the Court addressed the
closely related question of overbreadth and observed that the statute
embraced within its proscription only the lawful demands of parents. In
so limiting the breadth of the statute, the court pointed out that "[i]mplicit
in the concept of parental control is the idea that parents' control will be
lawful. Any other interpretation would reduce the statute to an absurdi-
ty."79 The same result has been reached when the definition of incorrigi-
bility was more narrowly phrased in the statute itself to encompass
disobedience of only lawful and reasonable commands of a parent or
guardian.80
The foregoing discussion of vagueness principles in connection with
PINS provisions suggests a remedy short of the radical step of total
removal of PINS cases from the jurisdiction of the juvenile courts. It is
hardly an arguable proposition that statutory provisions defining PINS in
terms of deportment which endangers morals, leading an idle, dissolute,
lewd or immoral life, and the like, are demonstrably vague and should be
stricken from the statutes.81 I would suggest, however, that the statutes
couched in terms of incorrigibility, ungovernability and beyond parental
control are sufficiently clear to withstand constitutional attack if they are
so limited as to encompass reasonable and lawful commands and that
78. 84 Wash. 2d 874, 529 P.2d 1096 (1975).
79. Id. at 878, 529 P.2d at I100.
80. See Commonwealth v. Brasher, 359 Mass. 550, 270 N.E.2d 389 (1971). In Brasher the court
observed that
the law clearly does not make mere expressions of disagreement or differences of views or
opinions between parents and child a crime on the part ofthe child. But it does not permit or
excuse stubborn refusals by children to obey reasonable and lawful commands of their
parents or persons similarly situated on a claim that it is merely the exercise of a right of
dissent.
Id. at 554, 270 N.E.2d at 393. Accord In re Gras, 337 So. 2d 641 (La. Ct. App. 1976); District of
Columbia v. B.J.R., 332 A.2d 58 (D.C.), cert. denied, 421 U.S, 1016 (1975).
One writer, commenting on provisions such as those formerly in eflect in California ("[a minor)
who persistently or habitually refuses to obey the reasonable and proper orders or directions of his
parents ...or school authorities ... " CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 601 (West 1972) (amended
1974)) has stated:
[T]he subject does not admit ofa more certain formulation. Such a standard is workable. It
suggests, without undue ambiguity, the considerations that are reYevant to support court
action; it gives a fair indication ofthe conduct to which legal consequences attach. Thisis not
to say that all existing formulations are exempt from criticism for vagueness. Theargument
merely affirms that a satisfactory standard can be formulated. Moreover, limiting
delinquency to violations of criminal law also involves resort to uncertainties, Consider
"disorderly conduct", "vagrancy", "disturbing the peace"-each a crime in spite of its lack of
precision.
Paulsen, The Delinquency, Neglect & Dependency Jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court, in JusTIcE ro
THE CHiLD, 50 (M. Rosenheim ed. 1962).
81. See notes 54-71 and accompanying text supra.
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proscriptions of habitual truancy and running away from home do not
raise significant vagueness problems. A statutory scheme thus limited
would not only be responsive to the charge of vagueness, but would also
enable the juvenile court to continue to deal with those areas of children's
conduct in which the state has a legitimate interest. In this connection,
one wonders whether the conduct charged and proved in a significant
number of cases in which attacks have been made on PINS statutes for
vagueness and overbreadth would nevertheless clearly fall within the
jurisdiction of the juvenile courts under this narrowed statutory definition.
In E.S.G.v. State, 2 tie finding of delinquency was based upon a section
of the Texas Juvenile Act defining a delinquent child as one who "habitual-
ly so deports himself as to injure or endanger the morals or health of
himself or others. ' 3  The conduct charged and proved was that the
fourteen-year-old appellant had been absent from home for several days at
a time, including a period of one week on occasion, and was found in a
transient apartment with an adult male. Obviously, if the statute had
contained the typical runaway provision, it would have furnished an
appropriate basis forjurisdiction and would have avoided running afoul of
vagueness problems.8 4 In other reported cases involving claims of vagu-
eness of omnibus clauses in PINS statutes, however, the conduct giving
rise to the proceedings is not set forth clearly, if it appears at all.85
In proceedings brought under ungovernability, incorrigibility, and
beyond parental control provisions, on the other hand, it is quite clear that
under a narrowed statute the conduct described in the cases would
properly continue to invoke juvenile court jurisdiction. In re Gras6
typifies cases of this variety. The appellant, who challenged a Louisiana
statute which defined a child in need of supervision as one who "habitually
disobeys the reasonable and lawful demands of his parents . ..and is
ungovernable and beyond their control, 87 had run away from home on six
occasions and also had violated the conditions of probation. Similarly, in
82. 447 S.W.2d 225 (rex. Ct. App. 1969); cert. denied, 398 U.S. 956 (1970).
83. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN., art. 2338-1 § 3() (Vernon 1971) (repealed 1973).
84. Subsequent to the decision in ES. G. v. State, the Texas statute was substantially amended.
The questionable language relating to endangerment of morals was removed, and the definition of
"conduct indicating a need for supervision" now includes"(t]he unexcused voluntary absence of a child
on 10 or more days or parts of days within a six-month period or three or more days or parts of days
within a four week period from schooL" See TEx. FAm. CODE ANN. tit. 3, § 51.03 (Vernon Supp.
1978).
85. See, e.g., S**** S**** v. State, 299 A.2d 560,561 (Me. 1973) ("We are not informed by the
record exactly what conduct of the juvenile was alleged in the petitions as supporting the conclusory
allegations."); Gonzalez v. Mailliard, No. 50424 (N.D. CaL 1971), vacated and remanded, 416 U.S.
918(1974). (It appears that in the case of at least three of the ten plaintiffs the underlying conduct was
an assault of a girl which, presumably, would be encompassed within other provisions of the juvenile
delinquency statute.); State v. L.N., 109 N.J. Super. 278,263 A.2d 150 (1970) (Defendant was allegedly
found sniffling carbon tetrachloride. There is a suggestion in the opinion that he may have violated a
section of the state's glue sniffing statute, but he was charged only under the omnibus clause.).
86. 337 So. 2d 641 (La. Ct. App. 1976).
87. LA. REv. STAT. AN. § 13.1569(15)(b) (West Supp. 1978).
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District of Columbia v. B.J.R.,s8 appellee was charged with absconding
from home on five occasions, the last three of which were within the nine-
month period before the petition was filed alleging her to be a child in need
of supervision. Simply stated, a review of the reported cases suggests that
carefully drafted ungovernability statutes, applied to the conduct des-
cribed in the cases, ought not to raise significant constitutional vagueness
problems.89
B. Punishment of Status
Whether the law may respond, or ought to respond, to certain kinds of
noncriminal misconduct by children in a way which differs from its
response to conduct by adults'is the question at the heart of a number of
proposals to abolish PINS jurisdiction. All too frequently, nevertheless,
the question is addressed in terms of the proposition that "status offenses"
should be removed from thejurisdiction of thejuvenile courts.90  The term
status offense has been variously defined, when defined at all, by those who
insist upon using it.91 This is at best confusing, and at worst an inaccurate
and misleading usage.
88. 332 A.2d 58 (D.C. 1975), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1016 (1975).
89. See, e.g., Blondheim v. State, 84 Wash. 2d 874, 529 P.2d 1096 (1975) (petitioner admitted
running away from home on at least six occasions); In re Napier, 532 P.2d 423 (Okla. 1975) (conduct
included running away from home and refusing to attend school); In re Jackson, 6 Wash. App. 962,497
P.2d 259 (Ct. App. 1972) (conduct included failure to attend school and use of dangerous drugs),
In the final analysis, the void-for-vagueness argument, when applied to PINS statutes, becomes in
one sense a reductio adabsurdum. It should be kept in mind that in the exercise of PINS jurisdiction
the courts are more often than not dealing with the conduct of subteens, including eight-, nine- and ten-
year olds. Nevertheless, the courts continue to pay lip service to the notion that a critical question Is
whether the statutes give fair notice or are framed in language which a respondent child has the ability
to comprehend. See, e.g., Blondheim v. State, 84 Wash. 2d 874,529 P.2d 1096 (1975); i re Burris. 275
N.C. 517, 169 S.E.2d 879 (1969); In re Jackson, 6 Wash. App. 962,497 P.2d 259 (1972), I do not mean
to suggest that the notice aspect of the vagueness doctrine does not make sense in other contexts. One
may reasonably assume, for example, that corporate officers and other business persons, or their
lawyers, carefully consult the statutes and regulations which govern their activities before undertaking
to engage in such activities. By the same token, it is not unlikely that persons engaging in conduct
ostensibly protected by the first amendment, such as picketing, publishinj:, leafleting and various kinds
of protest demonstrations have, at least in some instances, familiarized themselves with applicable
statutes or ordinances before acting. It is far more questionable, however, despite language in the
eases, that children consult the statute books before engaging in the kind!; of noncriminal misbehavior
defined in PINS enactments. Thus, it can hardly be suggested seriously that legislatures should be put
to the test of writing nonvague statutes for eight-year olds. It is the second aspect of vagueness,
however, which is critically important if, as I believe is likely and desirable, the juvenile courts continue
to exercisejurisdiction in PINS proceedings. More narrowly drafted statutes would serve to avoid the
danger of the improper delegation of policy matters to judges, which assertedly leads to the exercise of
discretion in a manner which is arbitrary and discriminatory. See Rosenterg &Rosenberg, supra note
41, at 1124.
90. See, e.g., Gilman, supra note 24; Martin, Status Offenders and the Juvenile Justice System.
Where Do They Belong, 28 Juv. JUST. 7 (1977); Martin & Snyder, Jurisdiction Over Status Qff'nses
Should Not Be Removed From the Juvenile Court, 22 CRIME & DELINQUrNcy 44 (1976).
91. "IT]he most general definition of a status offender is a child who commits an offense that
would not be considered a crime if it were committed by an adult. A variety of more explicit
definitions are available, yet the vast majority deal with this central theme." Martin, supra note 90, at
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In a recent commentary, the observation appears that "the Supreme
Court of the U.S. has ruled that it is constitutionally impermissible to
impose sanctions on a status in the case of an adult, Robinson v.
California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962). Yet . .. that is what thejuvenile court's
status offense jurisdiction does with respect to unruly children."92 This
statement, if it is not totally misleading, reflects an altogether too careless
reading of Robinson v. California.93 The Court in Robinson struck down
a section of the California Health and Safety Code that made it a criminal
offense to "be addicted to the use of narcotics." The statute, therefore,
made "the 'status' of narcotic addiction a criminal offense for which the
offender may be prosecuted 'at any time before he reforms'." 94 This was
held to inflict cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth and
fourteenth amendments because it imprisoned "a person thus afflicted as a
criminal, even though he has never touched any narcotic drug within the
state or been guilty of any irregular behavior there."95 The scope and
limitations of the decision may be readily ascertained from the Court's
precise language, for it is clear that it was the mere status of being a
narcotic addict which could not be made criminal, as distinguished from
the "irregular behavior" which might accompany such a status.
9 6
If there could have been any doubt about the clear teaching of
Robinson, it was surely laid to rest in Powell v. Texas.97 The appellant in
Powell challenged his conviction under a provision of the Texas Penal
Code which proscribed getting drunk or being found intoxicated in a
public place. The Supreme Court upheld Powelrs conviction, and in a
plurality opinion Mr. Justice Marshall pointed out that "appellant was
convicted, not for being a chronic alcoholic, but for being in public while
drunk on a particular occasion."98 The plurality opinion further noted
that
[t]he entire thrust of Robinson's interpretation of the Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause is that criminal penalties may be inflicted
only if the accused has committed some act, has engaged in some
9. "A status offense is a noncriminal act that subjects the child to thejurisdiction of thejuvenile court
not because of the act itself-it would not be a crime if it were committed by an adult-but because of
his status: he is a juvenile." Gilman, supra note 24, at 49.
92. UA-ABA STANDARDS, NONCRIMINAL MISBaHAVIOR, supra note 24, at 1I.
93. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
94. Id. at 666.
95. Id. at 667.
96. Indeed, just a few years later, the California Supreme Court in People v. O'Neil. 62 Cal. 2d
748, 401 P.2d 928, 44 Cal. Rptr. 320 (1965), so distinguished the Robinson principle, finding no
constitutional infirmity in a section of the state's Vehicle Code which made it a felony for a narcotic
addict, or one under the influence of narcotics, to drive a vehicle on any highway. 62 Cal. 2d at 754 n.9.
40 1 P.2d at 931 n.9, 44 Cal. Rptr. at 323 n.9. See also United States v. Bishop, 469 F.2d 1337 (1 st Cir.
1972); Bruno v. Louisiana, 316 F. Supp. 1120 (E.D. La. 1970).
97. 392 U.S. 514 (1968).
98. Id. at 532.
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behavior, which society has an interest in preventing, or perhaps in
historical common law terms, has committed some actus reus.
PINS statutes which prohibit habitual truancy, running away from
home, and the like proscribe particular kinds of conduct or behavior, and
obviously do not fall within the Robinson-Powell rationale. Indeed, even
when the statutes are cast in somewhat broader terms, such as incorrigi-
ble, ungovernable, or beyond parental control, an examination of those
statutes and the court decisions interpreting them will show that the
conduct or behavior of a child on a particular occasion or occasions is
involved. 00 Accordingly, the courts have properly rejected the argument
that PINS statutes so phrased permit punishment of a status in violation of
the eighth amendment proscription against the infliction of cruel and
unusual punishment. In sum, Judge Polier has appropriately stated that
"when youths are brought before the court on petitions alleging continuing
misconduct and the statutes require specific charges and dates, the use of
the term status offender is not appropriate. It mistakes the real issue and
the real problems arising from conduct not status."''
As I have suggested at the beginning of thispart of the discussion,"0 2
the "real issue" that underlies the various recommendations that juvenile
court jurisdiction over children's noncriminal misbehavior be abolished is
encompassed within the proposition that the legal position of children
should be precisely the same as that of adults. It is astonishing to note that
this radical proposal has been clearly and unequivocally articulated by lay
advocates of "children's liberation." One writer, for example, explicitly
rejects any double standard, calling for "the right to a single standard of
morals and behavior for children and adults.' 0 3  Similarly, another
commentator suggests that any young person should have "[tihe right to
do, in general, what any adult may legally do. ' 104 Such espousals as these,
obviously, are hardly in keeping with traditional notions with respect to
the legal position of children. They are, in fact, almost entirely contrary to
the current state of the law. No one would deny that the legal situation of
99. Id. at 533.
100. See cases cited at notes 82-84 & 86-89 and accompanying text infra.
101. Polier, The Future of the Juvenile Court, 26 Juv. JusT. 3, 6 (1975).
102. See text accompanying notes 90-91 supra.
103. R. FARSON, supra note 2, at 27 (emphasis added). Farson further observes:
Children, like adults, should have the right to decide the matters which affect them most
directly. The issue of self-determination is at the heart of children's liberation. Itis, infact,
the only issue, a definition of the entire concept. The acceptance of the child's right to self-
determination is fundamental to all the rights to which children are entitled . . . .Children
would have the right to engage in acts which are now acceptable for adults but not for
children, and they would not be required to gain permission to do something if such
permission is automatically granted to adults.
Id. at 27.
104. J. HOLT, supra note 2, at 19. Holt proposes:
[T]he rights, privileges, duties, responsibilities of adult citizens [should] be made available to




children has in recent years changed substantially as the law has come to
recognize their rights in a number of areas.105 There remains,
nevertheless, the strong presumption of minors' incapacity which
continues to be reflected in various restrictions on children's freedom to
exercise any number of rights accorded to adults.' 06 A far from
exhaustive catalogue would include proscriptions against or restrictions
upon voting, getting married, entering into binding contracts, driving
automobiles,10 7 drinking alcoholic beverages, and remaining on the streets
at any and all hours of the night. The same well-entrenched presumption
with respect to the immaturity and capacity of minors is reflected in the
determination by the United States Supreme Court that with respect to the
distribution of allegedly obscene materials to minors, a state might
constitutionally apply a more restrictive definition of obscene materials
than it does in the case of adults.1
0 8
1. The right to equal treatment at the hands of the law-i.e., the right, in any situation,
to be treated no worse than an adult would be.
2. The right to vote, and take full part in political affairs.
3. The right to be legally responsible for one's life and acts.
4. The right to work, for money.
5. The right to privacy.
6. The right to financial independence and responsibility-i.e., the right to own, buy
and sell property, to borrow money, establish credit. sign contracts, etc.
7. The right to direct and manage one's own education.
8. The right to travel, to live away from home, to choose or make one's own home.
9. The right to receive from the state whatever minimum income it may guarantee to
adult citizens.
10. The right to make and enter into, on a basis of mutual consent, quasi.fanilial
relationships outside one's immediate family-i.e., the right to seek and choose guardians
other than one's own parents and to be legally dependent on them.
Id. at 18-19.
105. See cases cited in notes 3-10 supra.
106. See Comment, Status Offenders and the Status of Children's Rights: Do Children Have
The Legal Right To Be Incorrigible, 1974 B.Y.U.L. REv. 659, 684; Hafen, supra note 1. Hafen
states:
The presumption of minors' incapacity has been so strong that the growth of democratic
ideals in American society, rather than encouraging the 'liberation! of children from
limitations upon their liberty, has encouraged even greater discriminaton on the basis o1
age-to protect children from the excesses of their immature faculties and to promote the
development of their ability ultimately to assume responsibility. The juvenile court
movement and the expansion of compulsory public education are obvious examples of the
way American democratization has reflected the views of Locke and Mill about protecting
and developing the capacities of the young.
Id. at 613.
The immaturity, and hence, the presumed incapacity, of children has been largely ignored in the
legal literature that is most harshly critical of PINSjurisdiction. Seearticles cited at note24supra. It
has not, however, been altogether ignored. Wald, for example, while urging the extension to children
over 12 of a whole range of civil rights, including freedom of speech and association, concedes that
some of them "may have to be redefined, in some instances even curtailed, as applied to youths."
Wald. supra note I, at 21.
Remarkably enough, Holt, one of the more vehement apostles of "children's liberation" describes
children as
animals and sensualists; to them, whatfeels good is good. They are self-absorbed and selfish.
They have very little ability to put themselves in another person's shoes, to imagine how he
feels. This often makes them inconsiderate and sometimes cruel, but whether they are kind
or cruel, generous or greedy, they are always so on impulse, rather than by plan or principle.
Holt, supra note 2, at 114 (emphasis in original).
107. See Berberian v. Petit, 374 A.2d 791 (R.I. 1977).
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minors, a state might constitutionally apply a more restrictive definition of
obscene materials than it does in the case of adults.10 8
A trilogy of recent Supreme Court pronouncements recognizing the
rights of minors vis-a-vis the state with respect to services and information
in the sex-related areas of abortion and contraception, although they
significantly expand the rights of minors, are not a rejection of or in any
way inconsistent with notions of the immaturity and presumed incapacity
of children. In Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth""
the Court held unconstitutional a Missouri statute which, in effect,
afforded to the parent of a child a veto over a decision by a physician and
his minor patient to terminate a pregnancy. In the course of its opinion,
however, the Court reaffirmed its long standing recognition of the
principle that the state's authority to regulate children's conduct was
broader than its authority to regulate the conduct of adults.110 In
addition, the Court included a significant caveat in its decision,
emphasizing that it did not mean to suggest in its holding "that every
minor, regardless of age or maturity, may give effective consent for the
termination of her pregnancy." '
In a subsequent case, Bellotti v. Baird,"2 the Court noted that its
decision in Danforth had not only struck down a statute creating a
parental veto, but also had held that a written consent requirement for a
pregnant adult would be unconstitutional only if it unduly burdened the
right to an abortion. In Bellotti, the Court explicitly recognized that there
were greater risks with respect to the ability of a pregnant minor to give
informed consent for an abortion."' Accordingly, while remanding the
case to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts for further
proceedings, the Court indicated that it might find no constitutional
infirmity in
a statute that prefers parental consultation and consent, but that permits a
mature minor capable of giving informed consent to obtain, without undue
burden, an order permitting the abortion without parental consultation,
and, further, permits even a minor incapable of giving informed consent to
obtain an order without parental consultation where there is a showing that
the abortion would be in her best interests.11
4
In short, the Court's opinion in Bellotti suggests that even in the area of
abortion, where the Court has afforded the most extensive constitutional
108. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968); See also Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S.
205, 212-213 (1975).
109. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
110. Id. at 74.
111. Id. at 75.
112. 428 U.S. 132 (1976).
113. Id. at 147.
114. Id. at 145.
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protection to adults," 5 differentiation in treatment between adults and
minors is permissible.
Although the final case in the trilogy, Carey v. Population Services
International,"6 might appear to be the most far reaching in its extension
of the rights of children to have access to sex-related health services, it is
not inconsistent with the Court's earlier opinions which recognize the
immaturity and incapacity of children. In Carey the plaintiffs successfully
challenged a provision of the New York Education Law which made it a
misdemeanor to sell contraceptive articles or drugs to minors under
sixteen years of age.1 7 The Court rejected the state's argument that the
statute served significant state interests in that it advanced New York's
policy of discouraging sexual activity among children,"8 but the Justices
noted with care that they were not departing from earlier holdings relating
to the scope of the state's power to control children's behavior,"19 even in
the context of the right to sexual privacy.1
2
Thus, it would seem to be beyond question that the law is not required
to treat adults and children according to a single standard of conduct. 2,'
As Judge Dembitz pertinently observed:
115. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
116. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
117. The challenged provision of the New York Education Law provided in pertinent part: "It
shall be a class A misdemeanor for .... 8. Any person to sell or distribute any instrument or article,
or any recipe, drug or medicine for the prevention of contraception to a minor under the age ofsixteen
years." N.Y. EDUC. LAw § 6811 (McKinney 1972).
118. Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l 431 U.S. 678, 689 (1977).
119.
"[We] have held in a variety of contexts that'the power of the state to control the conduct of
children reaches beyond the scope of its authority over adults', Prince v. Massachusetts,
supra, 321 U.S. at 170 . .. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968). ... See also,
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971)."
Id. at 688.
120. The plaintiffs in Carey asserted that New York's policy of discouraging children's sexual
activity was itself unconstitutional, arguing "that the right to privacy comprehends a right of minors as
well as adults to engage in private consensual sexual behavior." Id. at 689, n.17.
Mr. Justice Brennan, writing for the Court responded:
We observe that the Court has not definitively answered the difficult question whether and to
what extent the Constitution prohibits state statutes regulating such behavior amongadults.
See generally Note, On Privacy. Constitutional Protection for Personal Liberty, 48
N.Y.U.L. Rav. 670, 719-738 (1973). But whatever the answer to that question, Ginsberg v.
New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968) ...indicates that in the area of sexual mores, as in other
areas, the scope of permissible state regulation is broader as to minors than as to adults. In
any event, it is unnecessary to pass upon this contention of appellees, and our decision
proceeds on the assumption that the Constitution does not bar state regulation of the sexual
behavior of minors.
Id.
121. Some members of the Court were far less willing to leave the question open and proceed on
Mr. Justice Brennan's assumption. Mr. Justice Powell, although agreeing that the New York statute
was constitutionally defective, nevertheless recognized "the State's concern that its juvenile citizens
generally lack the maturity and understanding necessary to make decisions concerning marriage and
sexual relationships." Id. at 695. Similarly, Mr. Justice Stevens, with Mr. Justice White in
agreement, described as" 'frivolous' apellees' argument that a minor has the constitutional rightto put
contraceptives to their intended use, notwithstanding the combined objections ofboth parent and the
State." Id. at 701.
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
In the uncontrollable or beyond-lawful-authority child cases, the same basic
question is posed: How should the courts treat the plasticity of children
and their incapacity for self-direction as compared to adults? Differentia-
tions between them rest on physiological and sychological fact, rather than
cultural bias, as in the case of race or sex.'
C. Stigma
A third criticism of PINS jurisdiction is the proposition that
adjudication as a PINS has a "stigmatizing" effect upon the respondent
child.12 3  Typical of this view are the introductory comments by the
Reporter of the Standards Relating to Noncriminal Misbehavior of the
IJA-ABA Juvenile Justice Standards Project. The Reporter asserts that
"'status offenders' . . . likely bear the same burdens of stigma as do
delinquents. ' 24 At another point, he labels as "perverse reasoning" the
belief held by courts and court personnel that a PINS adjudication results
in less stigma than a delinquency adjudication.125  Similarly, a recent
critique of predelinquency diversion projects notes, apparently uncritically
and without question, that the projects "function on what is by now the
banal assumption that the formal processes of the juvenilejustice system-
courts, probation, detention-tend to be stigmatizing and ineffective in
preventing further delinquent acts. . .,,26 This statement raises by
implication, but leaves unanswered, the question of what evidence, if any,
supports this "banal assumption" and entitles it to continued indulgence.
One may fairly ask whether, in light of the evidence, it is rational to
conclude, or indeed even to argue, that "stigmatization" is a persuasive
rationale in support of proposals for the abolition of PINS jurisdiction.
Underlying the assertion that stigma is a significant negative factor in
thejuvenilejustice process is the "labeling hypothesis," which posits that "a
young person who has not committed a criminal act but is treated as and
stigmatized as a delinquent is likely to become one. .... 127 A recent,
This proposition was recently reaffirmed in another context in the lirst federal case adjudicating
the constitutionality of ajuvenile curfew ordinance. See Bykofsky v. Middletown, 401 F. Supp. 1242
(M.D. Pa. 1975), aff'd mem., 535 F.2d 1245 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 964 (1976).
122. Dembitz, Justice for Children-Now and for the Future, MO A.B.A.J. 588, 589 (1974)
(footnotes omitted).
123. See Gough, Beyond Control in the Juvenile Court-The Climate For Change, in BEYOND
CONTROL 272 (L. Teitelbaum & A. Gough eds. 1977); Orlando & Blaclh, Classifiication in Juvenile
Court: The Delinquent Child and the Child in Need of Supervision, 25 Juv. Jusr. 13, 19 (1974);
Rosenberg & Rosenberg, supra note 41, at 1128; Stiller & Elder, supra note 24, at 40.
124. UA-ABA STANDARDS, NONCRIMINAL MIsBEHAVIOR, supra note 24, at 3.
125. Id. at 8.
126. Schrag & Divoky, The New Juvenile Justice at Work, 2 Cry. Lie. Rev. 57, 58 (1975),
127. IJA-ABA STANDARDS, NONCRIMINAL MISnAVIOR, supra note 24, at 6. Orlando &
Black, supra note 123, at 20, describe labeling theory as the suggestion
that official response to delinquent behavior may often act to push the juvenile further into
deviant conduct. This theory has generally been called the'labelinghypothesis'. Thethrust
of the concept is that being identified as ajuvenile results in a 'spoiled' public identity. The
label results in degree of public liability through exclusion from participation in groups and
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thoroughgoing study by Anne Rankin Mahoney, 28 however, examines
the literature describing empirical research on labeling theory as it relates
to juveniles, casts considerable doubt on the validity of the labeling
hypothesis, and suggests that an affirmative response to the question posed
above cannot be given with any confidence. Mahoney notes that there is a
paucity of literature on the subject dealing specifically with juveniles,12 9
and after examining recent studies purporting to show that later
delinquent behavior increases as a result of labeling, finds that the evidence
on labeling theory is in conflict. 130  Mahoney also examines empirical
studies treating reactions to labeled youths by family and community and
the impact of labeling upon the juvenile's self-concept.1' In view of the
conventional wisdom with respect to labeling (or the vice of stigmatiza-
tion), 32 Mahoney's conclusions are arresting:
Perhaps, as research on labeling accumulates and becomes more precise,
and as we become better able to raise researchable questions, labeling will
emerge as an important causal factor in the etiology of delinquent behavior.
Meanwhile, no such evidence exists, andit would be a disservice to both
the labeling perspective and the youths in thejuvenilejustice system to act as
if it did. 33
Since Mahoney's significant critique of labeling theory was based
upon work undertaken for the Institute of Judicial Administration and
American Bar Association Juvenile Justice Standards Project, it is
distressing that the Reporter for the Project's volume, Noncriminal
events which would not occur without the prior attachment of the label. The social liability
has the further effect of reinforcing the deviance.
Id. at 20.
128. Mahoney, The Effect of Labeling Upon Youths in the Juvenile Justice Sytem:A Revlenof
the Evidence, 8 LAW & SocY REv. 583 (1974).
129. Id. at 586, 590. With respect to the studies she describes, Mahoney also points out:
[A]ll suffer from methodological problems because this is a very hard area in which to
conduct precise research. Labeling theory, as it is formulated, gives little guidance to the
researcher who wants to test its propositions. Although data on labeled offenders is
abundant and relatively easy to find, control data on comparable unlabeled offenders is
expensive and difficult to obtain. It is very hard to find similar youths who have committed
similar offenses-some of whom have been labeled and some of whom have not.
Furthermore, it is hard to find comparable youths who have had different dispositions and
thus different degrees of labeling.
Id. at 590-91 (citation omitted).
130. Id. at 597.
131. Id. at 599-608.
132. See notes 123-26 and accompanying text supra.
133. Mahoney, supra note 128, at 611. Mahoney's conclusion is apparently shared by others:
The labeling view has been criticized for lack of precision within its theories and there does
not exist a strong empirical literature which has tested the major assertions of this school.
Much of the research in support for the labeling views needs to be conducted before a final J
judgment can be made about the utility bf the theory. Moreover, many believe that the
labeling perspective should be integrated with other theories of juvenile delinquency-
particularly the psychodynamic theories on delinquency-to improve the explanatory power
of labeling theory.
NATIONAL INsTITUTE FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, PREVENTING
DELINQUENCY, WORKING PAPERS 142 (1977) [hereinafter cited as NUJDP, WORKING PAPERS].
1978]
OHIO STATE LA W JOURNAL
Misbehavior, declines to make reference to its persuasive analysis and
conclusions; instead, he merely acknowledges it when conceding that
labeling theory "has been under recent attack., 134  Moreover, the sole
study cited by the Reporter as "recent evidence to the contrary" of findings
such as Mahoney's, 135 a study by Robert G. Culbertson of 222 boys
incarcerated at the Indiana Boys Training School, a custodial institu-
tion,'36 contains the explicit caveat that "[it is not contended that the
research presented here is a test of labelling theory.'1 31 Since Culbertson
concludes only that his study furnishes "some tentative support for the
labelling perspective,"' 38 the Reporter's conclusion that the study
"demonstrated that the minors became what they were labeled to be"'139 is
at least highly questionable if not entirely misleading.
Even if one concedes for the purpose of argument that the conclusion
is justifiable, it provides no support whatsoever for the proposal that PINS
jurisdiction be abolished. As its title suggests, Culbertson's study was
limited to delinquent inmates of a custodial institution. One may readily
concede that institutionalization of PINS children is in many cases
undesirable, and there is good reason to believe that it may become a thing
of the past in the foreseeable future. 40  Nevertheless, it is the merest
armchair speculation to assert that any form of coercive intervention with
respect to children who are currently subject to the PINS jurisdiction of the
juvenile courts will inevitably result in such labeling and stigmatization as
will significantly affect the child's self-concept and lead to future antisocial
behavior.' 4'
D. Arguments Against PINS: An Overview
The discussion above has suggested that none of the three arguments
against PINS present a valid basis to justify abolishing the jurisdiction.
Vagueness attacks are appropriate with respect to only one of three
general categories of PINS provisions, and this category can be amended
or abolished without impairing the basic statutory scheme that governs
noncriminal misbehavior of children. Second, arguments that PINS
provisions unconstitutionally punish status are misdirected, while
134. IJA-ABA STANDARDS, NONCRIMINAL MISBEHAVIOR, supra note 24, at 6.
135. Id. at 6.
136. Culbertson, The Effect of Institutionalization on the Delinquent Inmate's Self Concept, 66
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 88 (1975).
137. Id. at 93.
138. Id.
139. IJA-ABA STANDARDS, NONCRIMINAL MISBEHAVIOR, supra note 24, at 6-7.
140. See notes 187-89 and accompanying text infra.
141. This is precisely the kind of speculation suggested by the conclusions set out in the ABA-
IJA Project volume on the subject: "On common sense grounds, given the lack of conclusive cmpiric
data, it seems likely that (1) coercivejudicial intervention in unruly child cases produces some degree of
labeling and stigmatization; and (2) whatever effect this has on the child's self-perception and future
behavior will be adverse." IJA-ABA STANDARDS, NONCRIMINAL MISBIJIIAVIOR, supra note 24, at 7.
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suggestions that children should be treated the same as adults in all
respects have little support in Anglo-American jurisprudence. Finally,
notions that PINS adjudication has a stigmatizing effect on children
simply have not been proved, and the most authoritative study of the social
science theory of "labeling" has recognized that research methods are at
present too imprecise to draw conclusions. In Part IV, therefore, reasons
for retention of PINS jurisdiction will be explored with the hope that
future efforts will be directed toward making the PINS statutory scheme a
better system for dealing with juveniles who are in need of assistance.
IV. REASONS FOR THE RETENTION OF PINS JURISDICTION
A. Family Autonomy
There is a strong and enduring tradition of family autonomy in
American law, of which the natural concomitant is parental authority.1
42
Beginning with Meyer v. Nebraska,43 in which the United States
Supreme Court explicitly recognized the right "to marry, establish a home
and bring up children"'144 as a "liberty" guaranteed by the fourteenth
amendment, the Court has over the years given strong support to the
prerogative of parents vis-a-vis the state. Shortly after its decision in
Meyer, the Court unequivocally reaffirmed this principle in Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, 45 a proceeding initiated by two private educational
institutions to enjoin the enforcement of Oregon's Compulsory Education
Law, which required parents to send their children to public schools. The
Court observed:
Under the doctrine of Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, we think it entirely
plain that the Act of 1922 unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents
and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their
control. As often heretofore pointed out, rights guaranteed by the
Constitution may not be abridged by legislation which has no reasonable
relation to some purpose within the competency of the State. The
fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in this Union
repose excludes any general power of the State to standardize its children by
forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only. The child is
not the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his
destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare
him for additional obligations.
46
142. See generally FOOTE, LEvy & SANDER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FAmILY LAw 1-26 (2d ed.
1976); Hafen, supra note 1, at 615-26. One writer has observed:
When you talk about the family, you're talking about a sacred institution in American
civilization. We rely on the family to provide the basic controls of our culture. We expect
parents to run the show;, we expect parents to be in charge of their children, and we back the
parents up with legal authority and judicial sanctions.
Arthur, Status Offenders Need Help, Too, 26 Juv. JusT. 3, 5 (1975).
143. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
144. Id. at 399.
145. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
146. Id. at 534-35.
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Almost a half-century later in Wisconsin v. Yoder147 the Court
reaffirmed the principles of family autonomy and parental authority
announced in Meyer and Pierce. In Yoder the parents who were members
of the Old Order Amish Religion challenged their convictions for violating
the compulsory education law of the State of Wisconsin, which required all
parents to cause their children to attend public or private school until age
sixteen. The respondents refused to send their fourteen- and fifteen-year-
old children to public school after they had completed the eighth grade and
claimed that the requirements of the Wisconsin statute violated their rights
under the fourteenth amendment and the free exercise clause of the first
amendment. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Supreme
Court of Wisconsin, which had invalidated respondents' convictions, and
quoted with approval its language from Pierce set out above, which was
characterized as "perhaps the most significant statement of the Court in
this area .... ,,14' The Court further observed:
[T]his case involves the fundamental interest of parents, as contrasted with
that of the State, to guide the religious future and education of their
children. The history and culture of Western civilization reflect a strong
tradition of parental concern for the nurture and upbringing of their
children. This primary role of the parents in the upbringing of their
children is now established beyond debate as an enduring American
tradition.
149
In the intervening years between its pronouncements in Pierce and
Yoder, both of which implicated compulsory education laws, the Court
has reaffirmed the principle of family autonomy in a variety of contexts.5
0
The cases illustrate that when the rights of parents to control their
children have come into direct conflict with interests asserted on behalf of
the state, the Court has been scrupulously protective of parental authority.
As has been observed elsewhere, 5' however, the Court has not dealt
directly with the case in which the rights of parents to control their children
have conflicted with interests asserted on behalf of the child. Most often,
it is this latter variety of conflict which is involved when PINS jurisdiction
is invoked on the ground of incorrigibility, ungovernability or being
147. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
148. Id. at 232.
149. Id.
150. See, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942), in which the Court, striking down
Oklahoma's Habitual Criminal Sterilization Act, observed: "We are dealing here with legislation
which involves one of the basic civil rights of man. Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the
very existence and survival of the race." Id. at 541; Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86
(1965). See also Cleveland Board of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974), in which the Court upheld
a challenge to the requirement of mandatory maternity leaves for teach-rs, stating that "[t]his Court
has long recognized that freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and familylife is one of the
liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 639.40,
Further, the Court's recognition of the principle has not been limited to traditional families held
together by matrimonial bonds. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
151. See Hafen, uspra note 1, at 619.
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beyond parental control.1 52 Further, the retention of PINS jurisdiction in
such cases is consistent with notions of family autonomy and its essential
concomitant, parental authority.
Despite currently popular assertions to the contrary,153 this is hardly a
startling proposition and indeed it has been expressed persuasively and
cogently in another context. In a discussion of voluntary commitments of
children to mental institutions by their parents, James W. Ellis has noted:
"Thomas Szasz argues that a source of parental power is the law's interest
in shoring up the institution of the family, and that hospitalization serves
this interest by reducing family tensions 'without disrupting the moral
integrity of the family as an institution!.' 154 Ellis further observes:
One does not have to share Szasz's ideology to agree that commitment laws,
and juvenile commitment provisions in particular, have as their paramount
objective the maintenance of family autonomy in dealing with aberrational
behavior within the family. As a result, the authority granted to parents in
the area of commitment to mental hospitals is extremely broad.1
55
Apart from arguments on the merits concerning parental commit-
ment of children to mental institutions,1 56 a subject beyond the scope of
this essay, it may be suggested that PINS jurisdiction similarly serves the
purpose of protecting family integrity by dealing with children whose
behavior imperils it. Both common sense and experience teach that the
aberrational conduct of one member of the family may place severe strain
on the functioning of the family as a unit.1 57 This is a factor which appears
not to have been taken into account in proposals for the abolition of PINS
jurisdiction.
One reformer has proposed that the courts should recognize parental
freedom only to the degree that such recognition is compatible with the
recognition of children's rights as individuals, apparently arguing, in
152. In one study of PINS jurisdiction sponsored by the IJA-ABA Juvenile Justice Standards
Project, the authors report that 59% of PINS petitions are brought by parents orparental surrogates.
Note, supra note 24, at 1385. Similarly, in a survey of PINS adjudicated children conducted by the
Office of Children's Services of theJudicial Conference of the State of New York, it was found that 65%
of the petitions were filed by the mothers of respondent children. JUDICIAL CONFERE.aNC OFTHE STATE
OF NEw YORK, THE PINS CHILD--A PLETHORA OF PROBLEMS 44,64 (1973) [hereinafter cited as TItE
PINS CHILD: A PLETHORA OF PROBLEMS].
153. A not atypical view has it that
allowing formalized coercive intervention (which is coercive only on one side-the child's), in
unruly child cases undermines family autonomy, isolates the child, polarizes parents and
children, encourages parents to abdicate their functions and roles to the court, may blunt the
effectiveness of any ameliorative services that are provided, and cuts against the develop-
ment of controls and means within the family for the resolution of conflicts.
IJA-ABA STANDARDS, NONCRIMINAL MISBEHAVIOR, supra note 24, at 11-12.
154. Ellis, Volunteering Children: Parental Commitment of Minors to Mental Institutions, 62
CALI. L. Rv. 840, 852 (citing T. SzAsz, LAw LIBERTY AND PSYCHIATRY, 154 (1963)).
155. Id. at 852.
156. See cases cited at note 10 supra.
157. See generally J. Haley, PROBLEM-SOLVING THERAPY (1976); V. SATiR, Co.NjoiNT FAMILY
THERAPY 1-2 (1964).
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effect, that the rights of children should receive a preferred position. 1"8 A
rational basis for this proposition is not readily apparent, 159 even when it is
merely the interests of the parent and a particular child that come into
conflict. It is even more difficult to perceive any rationale whatsoever for
preferring the misbehaving child when his conduct adversely affects the
entire family, particularly other children in the family. In sum, before
there is uncritical acceptance of the view that the child's interests should
bar coercive state intervention at the behest of the parents, one is entitled to
know what child's interests are to be preferred, how and by whom those
interests are to be identified, and what resolution is to be made when those
interests conflict with the interests of other members of the family.
Expression of this preference by means of abolishing PINS
jurisdiction could have particularly severe effects with respect to poor and
minority group families. In a frequently cited survey by the Judicial
Conference of the State of New York, which dealt with PINS children who
were before the New York City Family Court, it was found that forty-eight
percent of the children were Black, that twenty-five percent were Puerto
Rican and twenty-four percent were Caucasian.1 60 Further, the vast
majority, or eighty percent, "lived in health districts shown by eleven
social, economic and health indices to be the most deprived areas of the
city," and sixty-three percent lived below the poverty line. 161 Similarly,
the authors of a study of "ungovernability" cases brought in two counties
under the New York PINS statute claim that forty percent of the sample
cases surveyed Black children, twenty-eight percent inVolved Hispanic
children, and thirty-seven percent involved Caucasions. 162  Citing figures
such as these, the Reporter of the Standards Relating to Noncriminal
Misbehavior of the IJA-ABA Juvenile Justice Standards Project
concludes that PINS jurisdiction probably furthers racial and economic
discrimination. 1
63
It would, of course, be extremely naive to believe that racial and hence
economic discrimination do not accompany the exercise of PINS
jurisdiction, just as it would be naive to deny its existence in the case of
juvenile delinquency jurisdiction or the functioning of the adult criminal
158. Weiss, supra note 24, at 610. Cf. J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND TImE BEST
INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 7 (1973) (expressing in the context of child placement decisions, the "value
preference" that "the law must make the child's needs paramount").
159. In the context of child placement, J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD &A. SOLNIT, Supra note 158, at
7, assert that their preference for the law's making the needs of the child paramount "is in society's best
interests. Each time the cycle ofgrossly inadequate parent-child relationshiips is broken, society stands
to gain a person capable of becoming an adequate parent for children of the future."
160. THE PINS CHILD: A PLETHORA OF PROBLEMS, supra note 152, at 75.
161. Id. at 76.
162. Note, supra note 24, at 1387 n.27.
163. UA-ABA STANDARDS, NONCRIMINAL MISBEHAVIOR, supra note 24, at 12-13, The
Reporter appropriately concedes that "[b]ecause very little national information is available and one
must extrapolate from the few studies that have been done, it is difficult to estimate the degree to which
this occurs; the literature is very thin on the ground." Id. at 12.
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justice system. Nevertheless, the data cited by the Reporter are
susceptible to at least one other interpretation. In addition to the statistics
setting out the racial composition of the PINS population, the Judicial
Conference study revealed that of the 316 petitions included in the survey,
sixty-five percent were filed by the mothers of the respondent children.'6
Again, in the ungovernability study referred to above, it was found that
fifty-nine percent of PINS petitions were brought by parents or surrogate
parents. 165  Thus, it is fair to conclude that abolition of PINS jurisdiction
would have the most severe ramifications upon poor and minority group
parents who lack alternatives for dealing with the child whose conduct
threatens the family and who use the juvenile court as a last resort.166
B. Absence of Realistic Alternatives to PINS
Perhaps the most troubling aspect of proposals for abolition of PINS
jurisdiction is the failure of the proponents to devise, or even to suggest,
realistic alternatives for resolving the problems that the courts in
exercising the jurisdiction have sought to address. To the extent that an
alternative is offered at all, it is to insist that the "community,",6 7 or more
specifically the schools 6 and private social agencies, 6' meet their
164. THE PINS CHILD: A PLETHORA OF PROBLEMS, supra note 152, at 44.
165. Note, supra note 24, at 1385 n.21.
166. See Rangel, Juvenile Justice: A Need to Reexamine Goals and Methods, 5 CAPrToL. U.L
Rav. 149, 167-68 (1976):
Families who find that they cannot control the behavior of their children, whether because of
truancy, late hours, promiscuity or 'incorrigibility', and who do not have access to resources
in the community, such as sympathetic school personnel, psychiatric services, orcommunity
centers, look increasingly to the filing of a PINS petition as a disciplinary action. Thus the
court has come to be the tribunal of first resort for parents who are unable to cope with the
difficult behavior of their children.'
167. Comment, supra note 24, at 563.
168. Bazelon, supra note 24, at 44. JudgeBazelonargues that children skip school because they
do not like it, they become uncomfortable, and they are bored and often humiliated. Questioning the
practice of reporting children as truants, placing them on probation and ultimately referring them to
court and committing them to institutions, Judge Bazelon suggests the "saner and cheaper"
alternatives of compulsory school escorts, special community live-in schools and special classes and
enriched programs for truants. He concludes:
The situation is truly ironic. The argument for retaining beyond control and truancy
jurisdiction is that juvenile courts have to act in such cases because'ifwe don't act no one else
will'. I submit that precisely the opposite is the case: because you act, no one else does.
Schools and public agencies refer their problem cases to you because you havejurisdiction,
because you exercise it, and because you hold out promises that you can provide solutions.
Id.
Interestingly, Judge Bazelon's words echo strikingly similar observations made a little over ahalf
century ago. In a recent treatment of the origins of thejuvenile court movement, the author describes
the views expressed in ELIOT, THE JUVENILE COURT AND THE COMMUNITY (1916):
Thomas Eliot. . . wrote a remarkable book. . . in which he argued that, in many
respects, thejuvenile court was an unnecessary institution and that much of its work could be
done by other organizations and, in particular, the schools. Most of the functions performed
by the court were not essentiallyjudicial in character. The mere fact oftakingchild problems
into court would give them a penal flavour which was unnecessary and unfortunate
... . He also argued that truancy (and truant-and-parental schools) was more closely
allied to education than to the juvenile court or penology ....
Parker, supra note 27, at 292-93 (footnotes omitted).
169. See Bazelon, supra note 24, at 42; IJA-ABA, STANDARDS, NONcRMNtAL MISBEAVIOR,
supra note 24, at 15.
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responsibilities to troubled children. This option would seem necessarily
to be based on a number of highly questionable assumptions. First, it
rests on the assumption that voluntary agencies, in those communities
where they exist, either have the resources to take on the task or the
necessary resources will in some way be made available to them. It
should, however, be apparent that the facts are to the contrary. The New
York State Judicial Conference study notes, for example, that after the
New York legislature failed to allocate funds to establish new specialized
facilities for the newly created PINS provisions, it became clear that
adequate services for PINS children who required placement would not be
furnished by private, voluntary agencies.170  Further, community services
were least available where they were most needed, 71  Thus, experience
suggests that the view that elimination of PINS jurisdiction would
"stimulate the creation and extension of a wider range of voluntary
services than is presently available" 1 72 or require the community to devise
solutions is at best speculative and at worst quixotic.
A second questionable assumption underlying the proposed reliance
on voluntary agencies is that where such agencies exist, they would be
willing to offer a full range of services to children who would otherwise be
subject to the PINS jurisdiction of the courts. Again, experience provides
no reason to be optimistic on this score. Both empirical evidence", and
the observation of knowledgeable commentators17 5 support the conclu-
170. PINS: A PLETHORA OF PROBLEMS, supra note 152, at 7.
171. The study notes
the greater access that White children have to community services such as counselling, mental
health clinics and the like . . . . [T]he Black and Puerto Rican children came from areas
where there is a dearth of services while the White children came from somewhat better
communitiesin terms of available resources. In addition ... school authorities appear to
be more lenient toward-or adverse to taking action against-White children.
Id. at 23 (footnotes omitted).
The authors of a recent national study have reached similar conclusions and observed:
Facilities for providing services to juveniles are not generally available in many communities,
and there is some question as to their ability to prevent delinquent tendencies in status
offenders. Even the highly recommended youth service bureaus instituted in a few hundred
cities throughout the country have found it difficult to muster the resources to provide
necessary services to youth. In the absence of clearly-defined programs to help juveniles,
status offenders should remain within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court which can order
the necessary services for those youth who often have grave emotional and family problems.
NIJJDP, WORKING PAPERS, supra note 133, at 145.
172. IJA-ABA, STANDARDS, NONCRIMINAL MISBEHAVIOR, supra note 24, at 15.
173. Bazelon, supra note 24, at 44.
174. Both the voluntary agencies and DFY Title II programs (facilities operated by the New
York State Division for Youth, including urban homes, group homes, fo3ter homes and work camps),
are highly selective in the children whom they will accept. The children with serious emotional
problems, acting-out adolescents, drug users, children with a history of mental illness, children who
lack an intact family-these are the children who will be denied admis~ion to those elite programs,
They are the children who have been placed in the shelters or the training schools. The PINS CIJLD:
A PLETHORA OF PROBLEMS, supra note 152, at 9.
175. Justice Wise Polier, an experienced and respected former juvenile court judge has cogently
observed:
The proponents of reducing the rate of the juvenile courts stress th st little can be achieved
through intervention by the state which involves coercion. They pu?. their faith in voluntary
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sion that the children most needing services would be least likely to receive
them. Furthermore, even if the willingness of voluntary agencies to meet
the challenge of providing noncoercive services to the PINS population
were not in doubt, there would still be questions about their ability to do
so. There is no significant evidence that voluntary agencies are any more
competent than governmentally supported institutions. t76 Accordingly,
the authors of the New York Judicial Conference study have cautioned
that "[t]hese children cannot be left dependent on a social services system
or on schools and voluntary programs that have failed and continue to fail
to meet their needs."
177
Finally, it is fair to ask what reason there is to believe that PINS
children will be willing to make use of the services of voluntary agencies.
It seems unlikely that children who have refused voluntarily to go to
school or to respond to the parents who are charged with responsibility for
their tutelage will be any more willing to look to and respond to the
guidance of strangers. 178  It is not suggested here that voluntary agencies
do not play or should not play a critical role in the functioning of juvenile
courts.179 It is doubtful, however, that the child requiring services, or his
parents, will seek out the agency furnishing services in the absence of the
coercive power of the court to make alternative dispositions. Rather, in
the absence of PINS jurisdiction, there is reason to believe that significant
numbers of children will be abandoned to their own devices. t"
agencies and seem to regard all public services as coercive. They do not recognize that
exclusion from services may be the most severe form of coercion practiced against the poor.
They have not seemed to comprehend that most children and families coming before the
courts have previously been in or rejected by voluntary agencies. They ignore the lack of
standards of the preferential admissions policies that deny equal protection. They are blind
to the danger now resulting from the proliferation of commercial or proprietary child care
agencies under the doctrine that purchase of services that are from private agencies is
preferable to public services.
Polier, supra note 101, at 6-7. See also Rangel, supra note 166, at 168.
176. -See Tim PiNs CimiD: A PwroTHO or PR0BLE S, supra note 152, at 81.
177. Id. at 80.
178.
If parents acknowledge that they cannot get their child to attend school or cannot get him to
sleep at home, what makes anyone think that the youth will do so for someone else. What
basis is there for assuming that such a child will keep appointments with a voluntary agency.
Martin & Snyder, supra note 90, at 45.
179. District Judge Lindsay G. Arthur of the Juvenile Division, Hennepin County, Minnesota,
has recently stated:
Despite the persistence with which the reformers ignore the facts, the reality is that juvenile
courts now divert to voluntary treatment the majority of children brought before them. If
the child-and often her or his family-can go elsewhere and willgo elsewhere, most juvenile
courts will send them elsewhere. In point of provable fact, almost all, if not all, juvenile
courts divert every possible status offense case that comes before them. Theaverageis more
than half, far more than half. Nor are juvenile courts arguing that theyshould process more
status offenders-they would gladly divert even more than they do now. But courts do argue
for continued judicial authority to handle the residium of juveniles who cannot or will not
accept diversion; those children who need help but will not get it voluntarily.
Arthur, Status Offenders Need a Court of Last Resort, 57 B.U.L. Rv. 631, 632 (1977) (citations
omitted).
180. See Novak, The Incorrigible Child Under the New Pennsylvania Juvenile Act: An
Unsound, Unsupportable, and Unfortunate Policy Choice, 35 U. Prrr. L. REv. 73, 89 (1973).
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Even if the critics of PINS jurisdiction are correct in their judgment
that it has failed to achieve any significant benefits, abolition might
nevertheless be a mixed blessing at best. For at least some children, the
cure may be worse than the disease. As a number of observers have
pointed out, in any number of cases the conduct which brings a child
within the PINS jurisdiction of the juvenile court includes behavior which
could also subject the child to the court's juvenile delinquency jurisdiction
because it involves acts which would be criminal if committed by an
adult.' 8 1 One view of this phenomenon is that it is an example of the
misuse or abuse of PINS jurisdiction.18 2 It has been seen as particularly
inappropriate in view of the fact that a proper adjudication of juvenile
delinquency requires that constitutional due process protections be
afforded to the respondent child, including the stringent requirement of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 83 In PINS case:s, this protection is not
required in many jurisdictions and has not been held uniformly to be a
constitutional requisite.1
8 4
There is, however, another side to the coin. It is at least arguable that
in some cases in which a juvenile delinquency charge is, as a technical
matter, properly sustainable, a reduction to PINS would be appropriate
and, at least from the child's point of view, desirable. 85 Whether a PINS
petition replaces a juvenile delinquency charge as a result of a kind of
juvenile court "plea bargaining" or by reason of the exercise of discretion
by the court,1 86 there may be, again from the viewpoint of the child, an
important advantage. Despite the not infrequent claim that juvenile
delinquents and children adjudicated as PINS are treated identically, 187
this is clearly not always the case. It promises to be less so in the future if
we may judge by recent legislative developments.
181. See, e.g., THE PINS CHILD: A PLETHORA OF PROBLEMS, supra note 152, at 45; JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, JUVENILE INJUSTICE 3 (1973); Burt, supra note 1, at 133;
Polier, supra note 101, at 7.
182. See IJA-ABA STANDARDS, NONCRIMINAL MISBEHAVIOR, supra note 24, at 4; Rosenberg &
Rosenberg, supra note 41, at 1115-16.
183. See text accompanying notes 15-16 supra.
184. See Rosenberg & Rosenberg, sup'ra note 41, at 1118.
185. As one experienced juvenile court judge has noted:
Frequently, status offenses are used as a coverall, often becaus, there is less stigma to
incorrigibility than there is to a criminal label. If a child runs away from home and steals a
car to get on his way, he often will be charged with absenting instead ofcar theft. Ifheapplies
for a job later and thejuvenile record is revealed, he's much more likely to be refused thejob if
larceny shows on the record than if it shows only running away from home. Because plea
bargaining is becoming an ingrained American institution, the car theft can be bargained
away for an admission to absenting; the range of dispositions is the same; the public is equally
protected and the child is less stigmatized.
Arthur, supra note 142, at 6.
186. Under the New York Family Court Act, for example, at any time during a juvenile
delinquency proceeding the court may, on its own motion, substitute a PINS petition for a juvenile
delinquency petition. N.Y. FAm. CT. ACT (29A) § 716 (MeKinney 1975).
187. See, e.g., IJA-ABA STANDARDS, NONCRIMINAL MISBEHAVIOR, supra note 24, at 5: Gilman,
supra note 24, at 49; GouGH, supra note 123, at 272.
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NONCRIMINAL MISBEHA VIOR
Pursuant to the provisions of the federal Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974,88 financial assistance to states in
developing and implementing delinquency prevention programs is
conditioned upon the submission of plans that bar the placement of PINS
children in juvenile detention or correctional facilities and mandates that
such placements be in shelter facilities.189 The legislative response of the
State of New York to the federal enactment may prove to be prototypal,
for New York has eliminated the placement of PINS children in training
schools and secure detention facilities operated by the State Division for
Youth!" °
Even if this legislation is regarded as beneficial to children
adjudicated as PINS offenders, it does not come without a price. At
the same time that the New York legislature was "deinstitutionalizing"
PINS offenses in order to ensure that the state would continue to receive
federal financial assistance for its delinquency prevention programs, it was
also accelerating the trend toward more severe dispositions for certain
adjudicated juvenile delinquents. The state's Juvenile Justice Reform Act
of 1976,191 which enacted a number of definitional and procedural changes
with respect to juvenile delinquency jurisdiction, most importantly
provides not only for significantly increased periods of confinement, but
also mandates specific periods of secure confinement for fourteen- and
fifteen-year olds who have been adjudicated juvenile delinquents by reason
of having committed certain "designated felony acts.' 92  Although the
severe dispositions authorized by the Act are limited to serious or violent
juvenile offenses, it would be incautious to rule out the possibility that an
increasingly harsh view will be taken of delinquency in general.
If this speculation is correct, it may very well be that even
deinstitutionalization of PINS, apart from the radical step of eliminating it
from the jurisdiction of juvenile courts altogether, is not, from the
standpoint of the misbehaving or offending child, entirely a benefit. It is
not difficult to imagine, for example, one possible response when the police
encounter a child wandering the streets at all hours of the night, or are
summoned by a parent to deal with a child who is violently out of control.
188. Pub. L. No. 93-415. See Bayh, New Directions For Juvenile Justice, TRtAL, February,
1977, at 20.
189. 42 U.S.C. § 5633(12) (1974).
190. N.Y. EXEc. LAW. §§ 501, 510, 511 (McKinney Supp. 1977).
191. 1976 N.Y. Laws, c. 878. See Comment, The New York Juvenile Justice Reform Act of
1976: Restrictive Placement-An Answer to the Problem of Seriously Violent Youth? 45 FORDHAM L
REv. 408(1976). For a brief and highly critical appraisal of the Act, seeCohen, Juvenlle Justice: New
York's Act Is Hard To Follow, TRIAL, February, 1977, at 28.
192. N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT. (29A) § 712 (McKinney Supp. 1978). See Gadbois & Black, 1976
Amendments to the Juvenile Court Law: Adult Treatmentofl6-17 Year Old Offenders,9 U.W.LA. L
Rav. 13 (1977), which describes similar legislative developments in California as "a frankly political
compromise, in which a theoretically tougher approach to the problem of serious juvenile crime was
adopted in return for a sharp curtailment of the quasi-criminal aspects of the handling of status
offenses." Id. at 14 (footnotes omitted).
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A policeman facing a situation where even temporary detention is not
authorized may choose the obvious alternative of lodging a form of cover
charge'93 such as harassment, resisting arrest or the like, available under
the court's juvenile delinquency jurisdiction, as a basis for detaining the
child, and thereby at least resolving the immediate problem. 94 In sum,
the removal of PINS from thejurisdiction of thejuvenile court, rather than
eliminating old problems, may create new ones.
V. CONCLUSION
Not unlike other legal responses to societal problems, PINS
jurisdiction has clearly fallen far short of resolving the problem it was
created to address. Nevertheless, as the writers of one early commentary
on PINS observed:
While simply removing the court's jurisdiction over the ungovernable child
may have a certain seduction as a temporary answer, we seriously doubt that
it would work any ultimate resolution. There will obviously remain cases
where the child simply can't "make it" at home, in which judicial action will
be required. 195
These words are no less true today that at the time they were written.
In view of the considerations outlined above, it would be precipitate to
abandon altogether the resources and expertise, however limited, which
have developed over the years in attempting to deal with noncriminal
misbehavior by children, in the absence of alternatives which promise
greater success.
193. Cf. P. CHEVIGNY, POLICE POWER 136-41 (1969) (describing in detail a police practice of
covering street abuse by arresting the victim and lodging charges such as harassment, disorderly
conduct or resisting arrest).
194. There are, of course, cases in which a child's conduct, howecer viewed, will not satisfy the
elements ofjuvenile delinquency. A frequent suggestion is that many PINS cases ought to be handled
under the child neglectjurisdiction ofjuvenile courts. See Note, supra note 24, at 1393. Before seizing
upon this alternative, however, one should consider the implications for the rights of parents. It has
been suggested that the due process afforded the respondent in a neglect proceeding ought not to be as
extensive with that required in a delinquency proceeding. See Becker, Due Process and Child
Protective Proceedings: State Intervention on Behalf of Neglected Chitdren, 2 CO1,.-SAM. L, RLV.
247, 260-61 (1971); Levine, Caveat Parens: A Demystification of the Child Protection System, 35 U.
Pier L. REv. 1, 2 (1973). There are impressive arguments to the contrary. The author of an article
prepared under the auspices of the IJA-ABA JuvenileJustice Standards Project argues that the neglect
jurisdiction of the juvenile courts should be narrowed. Wald, Stat? Intervention On Behalf of
"Neglected" Children: A Search For Realistic Standards, 27 STAN.-L."Ri:v:955 (1975). When a child is
charged with delinquency, Wald would permit neglect charges to be lodzed only in cases in which the
parent had directly caused the child's delinquent conduct. Id. at 1036.
195. Gough & Grilli, The Unruly Child and the Law: Toward a Focus on the FanilV, 23 Riv,
JrsT. 9, 12 (1972).
